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SEMEL IN VITA: DESCARTES’ STOIC VIEW
ON THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN LIFE
David Cunning

In his June 1643 letter to Princess Elizabeth, Descartes makes a claim that is
a bit surprising given the hyper-intellectualism of the Meditations and other
texts. He says that philosophy is something that we should do only rarely.
Here I show how Descartes’ recommendation falls out of other components of
his system—in particular his stoicism and his views on embodiment. A consequence of my reading is that to an important degree the reasoning of the Fourth
Meditation is the imprecise reasoning of a not-yet-Cartesian meditator.

In the early stages of articulating his ethical views to Princess Elizabeth,
Descartes makes a claim that might seem a bit odd against the background
of the hyper-intellectualism of the Meditations. He says,
I am almost afraid that Your Highness may think that I am not now
speaking seriously; but that would go against the respect which I owe
her and which I will never cease to show her. I can say with truth that
the chief rule I have always observed in my studies, which I think
has been the most useful to me in acquiring what knowledge I have,
has been never to spend more than a few hours a day in the thoughts
which occupy the imagination and a few hours a year on the thoughts
which occupy the intellect alone. I have given all of the rest of my
time to the relaxation of the senses and the repose of the mind.1
In the Second Meditation Descartes emphasizes our nature as thinking
things, and we might expect that his views on how best to live would be
commensurate with that nature. However, he recommends to Elizabeth
that philosophy be done sparingly. He himself appreciates the unexpectedness of the recommendation. He is a philosopher, and someone who
throughout his corpus speaks to the height of philosophical activity, but
he says that for the most part it should be avoided.
In this paper I do four things. In section one, I lay out Descartes’ place
in a tradition in which minds and intellectual activity are regarded as
far superior to bodies and bodily activities. Descartes embraces some
of this tradition, but he thinks that bodies have been undervalued. In
section two, I consider Descartes’ stoicism and the pillars of his system
that entail it. I argue that it is from this stoicism, in conjunction with his
view that finite wills are often frustrated by bodily processes, that he
generates the view that philosophy is to be done sparingly. In section
three I consider the objection that for Descartes finite wills are wholly
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 24 No. 2 April 2007
All rights reserved

165

166

Faith and Philosophy

unconstrained. I conclude with a brief discussion of Descartes’ status as
an anti-philosophical philosopher.
I
There are a number of places in which Descartes represents the mind and
its activities as more exalted than the activities of the body. For example,
he writes that
[B]ecause nobody except God knows everything perfectly, we have
to content ourselves with knowing the truths most useful to us. The
first and chief of these is that there is a God on whom all things
depend. . . . The second thing we must know is the nature of our
soul. We must know that it subsists apart from the body, and is much
nobler than the body, and that it is capable of enjoying countless satisfactions not to be found in this life.2
At the end of the Third Meditation he says that one of these satisfactions
results from disembodied reflection upon the greatness of God.3 For the
time being, however, we are stuck in “the prison of the body.”4 Accordingly, it is
this same contemplation [of the divine majesty], albeit much less
perfect, [that] enables us to know the greatest joy of which we are
capable in this life. (AT 7:52)
In the 1 November 1646 letter to Chanut, Descartes says that if it did not
have the ability to experience passions,
our soul would have no reason to wish to remain joined to its body
for even one minute. . . .5
When he repeatedly refers to Gassendi as Flesh in Fifth Replies, he is
certainly not intending a compliment.6 On the flipside, Gassendi is not
imagining things when he assumes that Descartes would prefer to be
identified as Mind.7
Descartes regards the mind and its pursuits as more noble than those of
the body. However, he allows that body has some value, as presumably he
should if he is also going to hold that the extended universe is a creature
of God. He says that we would have no reason to wish to remain joined
to our bodies if we did not have the ability to experience passions, but of
course we do have the ability to experience passions. He thus writes that
the pleasures of the body are minor. . . . However, I do not think that
they should be altogether despised, or even that one should free oneself altogether from the passions.8
Indeed, he says that there are benefits to having passions and that a person
is better oﬀ for taking advantage of these:
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[T]he pleasures common to it [the soul] and the body depend entirely
on the passions, so that persons whom the passions can move most
deeply are capable of enjoying the sweetest pleasures of this life.9
The pleasure that accompanies a passion is not the qualitative equal of the
pleasure of a disembodied mind, but in this life we are not disembodied.
Descartes is not alone among rationalist-minded thinkers in placing
a higher value on mind than body. In the Platonic tradition, “the true
philosopher despises” bodily things.10 The body “keeps us busy in a
thousand ways because of its need for nurture” (66b), and “makes us too
busy to practise philosophy” (66d). Accordingly, “the philosopher frees
the soul from association with the body as much as possible” (64e–65a).
For Socrates, souls are invisible, intangible, indivisible, and divine, and
bodies are their opposite (78b–80b). Because a soul is what activates a
body, a soul is active, and its opposite (body) is “death” (105c–e). Later
figures then absorb the view that body is a low-grade kind of being. In
“On Beauty,” Plotinus oﬀers an extended diatribe against the body.11 His
disciple Augustine continues the barrage:
How highly do you value th[e] will? You surely do not think it
should be compared with wealth or honours or physical pleasures,
or even all of these together. . . . Then should we not rejoice a little
that we have something in our souls—this very thing that I call a
good will—in comparison with which those things we mentioned
are utterly worthless . . . ?12
For Augustine, body is so bad that sin consists in turning our attention
away from eternal things to things that are temporal and corporeal (27).
This kind of thinking finds its way into the seventeenth century as well.
The Cartesian (and Augustinian) philosopher Nicholas Malebranche calls
on us to resist the allure of the bodies that surround us and look instead to
the “land of ideas.”13 In the course of defending his occasionalism, he infers
from the “immutable law that inferior things serve superior ones” that bodies cannot act upon souls.14 Malebranche’s contemporary Ralph Cudworth
argues that bodies are at the bottom of the hierarchy of creatures:
There is unquestionably, a Scale or Ladder of Nature, and Degrees of
Perfection and Entity, one above another, as of Life, Sense, and Cogitation, above Dead, Sensless and Unthinking Matter; or Reason and
Understanding above Sense, &c.15
Cudworth agrees with Malebranche that bodies cannot act upon souls,
but he also holds that “it is not so decorous in respect of God . . . [to] do all
the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly.”16 Accordingly, He
does not attend to corporeal aﬀairs.17 Anne Conway defends the view that
body is so terrible that God would not, and did not, create it:
how can any dead thing proceed from him or be created by him,
such as mere body or matter . . . ? It has truly been said that God
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does not make death. It is equally true that he did not make any dead
thing, for how can a dead thing come from him who is infinite life
and love? Or, how can any creature receive so vile and diminished
an essence from him (who is so infinitely generous and good) . . . ?18
For Conway, God only creates souls, and so the everyday objects that surround us are something other than what we thought.19 Descartes is clearly
in the tradition of these thinkers. He takes body to be of some value, but it
is not as exalted as mind.
II
In this section I consider Descartes’ stoicism and its implications for the question of the extent to which an embodied mind should do philosophy.20 In
eﬀect I am following up on Descartes’ claim that although the “satisfactions”
of the mind are enormous, for the most part they are “not to be found in this
life.” We should instead rest content with the goods that are open to us.
As it is for Leibniz and Spinoza, for Descartes stoicism is the ethical
theory that best squares with the doctrine of divine immutability.21 He
says to Elizabeth,
[t]he first and chief of [the truths most useful to us] is that there is a
God on whom all things depend, whose perfections are infinite, whose
power is immense and whose decrees are infallible. This teaches us to
accept calmly all the things which happen to us as expressly sent by
God. Moreover, since the true object of love is perfection, when we
lift up our minds to consider him as he is, we find ourselves naturally
so inclined to love him that we even rejoice in our aﬄictions at the
thought that they are an expression of his will.22
It is true that some of us might entertain a standard of goodness according
to which not everything that happens is good. If so, we are not taking into
account all of the relevant data, and the judgments that we make in the
light of this standard will be hasty.23 We must also take into account, and
indeed privilege, the unrevisable axioms of metaphysics (e.g., that God is
perfect and immutable). When we take the right kind of perspective on
events we see that
there is nothing to show that the present life is bad. . . .24
We see that
[t]rue philosophy . . . teaches that even amid the saddest disasters
and most bitter pains we can always be content, provided that we
know how to use our reason.25
Descartes’ God preordains all events from eternity, and His immutable
will does not depart from the preordained order.26 What happens will
happen anyway, and in addition it will be good.27 Descartes writes,
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In my view, the way to reach the love of God is to consider that he
is a mind, or a thing that thinks; . . . we must also take account of
the infinity of his power, by which he has created so many things of
which we are only a tiny part. . . . Finally, we must weigh our smallness against the greatness of the created universe. . . . If a man meditates on these things and understands them properly, he is filled
with extreme joy. . . . Joining himself willingly entirely to God, he
loves him so perfectly that he desires nothing at all except that his
will should be done. Henceforth, because he knows that nothing can
befall him which God has not decreed, he no longer fears death, pain
or disgrace. He so loves this divine decree, deems it so just and so
necessary, and knows that he must be so completely subject to it that
even when he expects it to bring death or some other evil, he would
not will to change it even if, per impossible, he could do so. He does
not shun evils or aﬄictions, because they come to him from divine
providence; still less does he eschew the permissible goods or pleasures he may enjoy in this life, since they too come from God. He
accepts them with joy, without any fear of evils, and his love makes
him perfectly happy.28
For Descartes, stoicism is the ethical theory that best squares with the doctrines of divine immutability and divine omnibenevolence.
Another feature of stoicism that Descartes finds attractive is the emphasis that it puts on decreasing the extent to which our wills are subordinated
to bodily influences. Descartes speaks to the control of the body over the
will in a number of passages. For example, he says to Elizabeth that
each person wants to make himself happy; but many people do not
know how to, and often a bodily disposition prevents their will from
being free. . . . [There is] nothing more distressing than being attached to a body which altogether takes away its freedom.29
In Passions of the Soul, he speaks again of the body as limiting the freedom
of the will and says that in some cases the will is enslaved:
[opposing passions] pull the will first to one side and then to the
other, thus making it battle against itself and so putting the soul in
the most deplorable state possible. . . . [The] two passions jostle the
will in opposite ways; and since the will obeys first the one and then
the other, it is continually opposed to itself, and so it renders the soul
enslaved and miserable.30
For Descartes, passions are caused by motions on the pineal gland.31 As
passions incline the will, corporeal motions are sometimes in charge of
how the will inclines.
A passion is just one example of a corporeal eﬀect that influences the
will. Descartes also holds that corporeal processes are responsible for the
ambivalence that a will undergoes after adopting a new belief in place of
an old one. In the First Meditation, he speaks of the power of long-standing
commitments to
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keep coming back, and, despite my wishes, [to] capture my belief,
which is as it were bound over to them as a result of long occupation
and custom.32
Descartes holds more generally that no matter how much philosophical
reflecting we do, our pre-philosophical conceptions work to hold their
ground:
In later years the mind is no longer a total slave to the body, and
does not refer everything to it. Indeed, it inquires into the truth of
things considered in themselves, and discovers very many of its previous judgements to be false. But despite this, it is not easy for the
mind to erase these false judgements from its memory; and as long
as they stick there, they can cause a variety of errors. For example,
in our early childhood we imagined stars as being very small; and
although astronomical arguments now clearly show us that they are
very large indeed, our preconceived opinion is still strong enough to
make it very hard for us to imagine them diﬀerently from the way
we did before.33
The cognitive processes that Descartes is mentioning here are largely
physiological. Imaginings are “shadows and pictures of” the bodies that
we encounter in sensation,34 and both involve the soul inspecting a figure on the pineal gland.35 A sensation always occurs independently of our
will; the soul inspects a figure that has been traced on the pineal gland by
bodies that pass through the nerves.36 When we imagine something the
figure is traced either by a volition of the soul or, in less intentional cases,
by bodies in the brain that as a result of purely mechanistic processes trace
figures that are similar to the ones normally traced through the nerves.37
In the latter kind of case, will and imagination can work at odds. When we
want to imagine something, we have a volition that makes
the [pineal] gland lean . . . first to one side and then to another, thus
driving the spirits towards diﬀerent regions of the brain until they
come upon the one containing the traces of the object we want to
remember.38
If, as sometimes occurs in the case of imagination, something other than our
will drives the spirits to appropriate traces in the brain, we might recall an
opinion that we have habitually aﬃrmed and have assumed is indubitable.
In particular, when we do philosophy and so talk and think about things
like God, bodies, and the soul, the discussion will lead us to remember our
“preconceived opinion[s]” about these, to ill-eﬀect.39 If Descartes holds that
the physical causes of a particular memory can be in place independently
of our will, he would expect that many of us would stagger in the course
of doing philosophy.
Our embodiment also interferes with our ability to do philosophy in so
far as we are almost constantly bombarded with perceptions of sensible
bodies. In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes remarks that one of the things
that keeps us from a clear and distinct perception of God’s existence is that
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“the images of things perceived by the senses . . . besiege my thought on
every side . . . .”40 Our perceptions of such bodies make it very diﬃcult for
us to turn our attention to anything else:
We know by experience that our minds are so closely joined to our
bodies as to be almost always acted upon by them; and although when
thriving in an adult and healthy body the mind enjoys some liberty to
think of other things than those presented by the senses, we know
there is not the same liberty in those who are sick or asleep or very
young. . . . I have no doubt that if it [the mind] were released from the
prison of the body, it would find [its innate ideas] within itself.41
A significant part of what it is to do philosophy, according to Descartes,
is to attend to principles and ideas that do not “accord with the senses.”42
We must divorce ourselves from sensible objects,43 but to do so is to fight
and resist our embodiment and to live and re-live the conflict between
the truth and our long-standing commitments. This kind of torment and
frenzy is not to be encouraged:
happiness consists, it seems to me, in a perfect contentment of mind
and inner satisfaction, which is not commonly possessed by those
who are most favoured by fortune, and which is acquired by the
wise without fortune’s favor. So vivere beate, to live happily, is just to
have a perfectly content and satisfied mind.44
As a stoic Descartes regards tranquility of mind as an end in itself.45 He
thinks that “free will is in itself the noblest thing we can have, since it makes
us in a way equal to God,”46 but he does not thereby think that our freedom
consists in the independence that marks the divine will. This is instead a
standard to which we should aspire.47 One way that we can protect the
will from disturbances is by working on the body to keep our passions in
moderation.48 Another is to have a firm and unwavering resolve to do what
we take to be best in a given situation, and to appreciate that because that
is the most that a finite mind can do, we should never feel regret if things
turn out poorly.49 Another is to direct the will from circumstances that are
bound to wreak havoc on it.50
According to Descartes, an embodied mind is not suited for philosophical reflection. Not only do episodes of philosophical reflection disturb the
will, they will be counter-productive if they are not brief, and if they are
not few and far between:
[o]ur nature is so constituted that our mind needs much relaxation
if it is to be able to spend usefully a few moments in the search for
truth. Too great application to study does not refine the mind, but
wears it down.51
In the course of doing philosophy, the influences of the body inevitably
present themselves and make us think in ways that interfere with our
progress. We remember our pre-conceived opinions, and in our weakened
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state regard them as plausible. We become agitated, and ambivalent, and
our attempts to press ahead will yield at best diminishing returns.52 Simply
put, philosophy is not for us. We might regret that we can only do so much
of it, but as a stoic Descartes thinks that we should conform our wills to the
reality in which we find ourselves:
we should not reckon the time which we could have spent on instructing ourselves by comparison with the number of hours we
have had at our disposition but rather, I think, by comparison with
what we see commonly happens to others, as an indication of the
normal scope of the human mind.53
There are activities that are more suitable for an embodied mind, and we
should pursue those instead.54 We must appreciate what is possible for us
and what is not, and adjust our desires accordingly.55
III
A potential problem for the argumentation of section two is that there are
passages in which Descartes appears to insist that finite wills are free in a
libertarian sense.56 That argumentation depends on the premise that finite
wills are often constrained and even enslaved by bodily processes, but if
Descartes is a libertarian he does not accept this premise. Indeed, if finite
wills are radically free, and if the activities of the mind are more exalted
than those of the body, it is not clear why we should not exercise our libertarian freedom and do as much philosophy as possible.
One passage in which Descartes might appear to be supporting a libertarian view of human freedom is in his 1645 letter to Mesland. There, he
says that
absolutely speaking . . . it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly perceived
truth, provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing.57
One of the reasons that this passage might appear to be evidence for the
view that Descartes is a libertarian is that in other texts he is explicit that
clear and distinct perceptions are utterly will-compelling.58 If it is always
open to us to refrain from admitting a clearly perceived truth, it must be
possible for us to resist compulsion in any other situation as well.59
An examination of the larger context of the passage in the Mesland
letter shows that it is not evidence that Descartes holds that finite wills
are free in a libertarian sense. In the previous letter to Mesland Descartes
had said that
I agree with you when you say that we can suspend our judgment;
but I tried to explain in what manner this can be done. For it seems to
me certain that a great light in the intellect is followed by a great inclination in the will; so that if we see very clearly that a thing is good
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for us, it is very diﬃcult—and on my view impossible, as long as one
continues in the same thought—to stop the course of our desire.60
Descartes’ view that clear and distinct perceptions are will-compelling is
the view that so long as the intellect has a clear and distinct idea, it is
impossible for the will to refrain from aﬃrming it.61 What it is for a finite
mind to clearly and distinctly perceive X is for its intellect to have a clear
and distinct idea of X and for its will to aﬃrm X, but while the intellect is
presenting this clear and distinct idea, the will cannot stop aﬃrming it to
turn its attention to something else. Instead, another idea must be put in
place of the clear and distinct idea, and by something other than the will.
As Descartes says by way of qualification in the February 1645 letter, we
suspend judgment when something else distracts the will from a clear and
distinct idea—for example the desire to exhibit our freedom.62 The correspondence with Mesland does not provide any evidence that Descartes is
a libertarian.
A second piece of apparent evidence for the view that Descartes has
a libertarian account of human freedom is that he thinks that we merit
praise and blame for what we do. He says in Principles I:37,
We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the movements they were designed to perform, because the production of
these movements occurs necessarily. It is the designer who is praised
for constructing such carefully-made devices; for in constructing
them he acted not out of necessity but freely. By the same principle,
when we embrace the truth, our doing so voluntarily is much more
to our credit than would be the case if we could not do otherwise.63
This passage does not reflect the view that Descartes is a libertarian. He
indeed suggests that a necessary condition of meriting praise or blame is
being able to “do otherwise,” but he is not thereby committed to the view
that we are always able to do otherwise. The passage even raises questions
about the unrestrictedness of finite will in cases of action in which we do
merit praise or blame. Descartes says that when we embrace the truth, we
do so voluntarily and merit praise. However, he also holds that we cannot
help but aﬃrm what we clearly and distinctly perceive, and one of his
most pronounced statements of this view appears just a few sections after
Principles I:37, at AT 8A:21. If we cannot help but aﬃrm what we clearly
and distinctly perceive, and if our aﬃrmations of clear and distinct perceptions are still voluntary and free, then voluntariness is not a matter of
libertarian freedom.64
The remaining evidence for the view that Descartes holds that finite
wills are wholly independent is the representation of freedom in the Fourth
Meditation. Before considering that evidence, however, it is important to
note that even if the Fourth Meditation conflicts with the view that finite
wills are often determined by bodily processes, the latter view is the predominant one in his corpus. We have considered numerous passages that
reflect this view, and neither the Mesland letter nor Principles I:37 speaks
against it.65 Still, it would be preferable if there was a natural way of reading
the Fourth Meditation that did not have Descartes contradicting himself.
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The contradiction would be egregious, and would be present in what is
arguably his philosophical masterpiece.
In the Fourth Meditation Descartes defines will as “our ability to do or
not do something” (AT 7:57) and emphasizes that when exercising will “we
do not feel we are determined by any external force” (ibid.). He contrasts
will with intellect, the other faculty involved in judgment. Whereas intellect
is limited, in that “countless things may [and of course do] exist without
there being any corresponding ideas in me” (AT 7:56), will is “not restricted in any way” (AT 7:57). Finite will is independent, and so independent
that it is with respect to will, and not limited intellect, that human minds
most resemble God (ibid.). The “scope of the will is wider than that of the
intellect” (AT 7:58), and it is in the extent of the gulf between them that
Descartes locates the source of human error. There is no denying that the
Fourth Meditation view of freedom is to some degree libertarian. However,
it is not necessarily the view that Descartes endorses in the final analysis.
There are a number of passages in the Meditations that reflect that in
it the meditator is gradually advancing from a position of confusion to
a position of clear and distinct perception.66 In the First Meditation, the
meditator advances the view that “[w]hatever I have up till now accepted
as most true I have acquired either from or through the senses” (AT 7:18).
This is not evidence that Descartes accepts that view, and he in fact holds
that our opinions about bodies are in part a matter of “purely mental scrutiny.”67 In the Second Meditation the meditator announces that he “will
use [his] imagination” (AT 7:27) to know himself better. This is not evidence that Descartes accepts the view that we know our minds via imagination, and he in fact thinks that to use the imagination to know the soul
is like “trying to use one’s eyes in order to hear sounds or smell odours.”68
Later in the Second Meditation the meditator avers that “general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more confused” than particular ones (AT
7:30). Upon further meditation, he appreciates that the nature of body is
perceived by the mind alone and adds that
I am speaking of this particular piece of wax; the point is even clearer
with regard to wax in general. (AT 7:31)
In the Fourth Meditation, the meditator considers that
whenever we are inquiring whether the works of God are perfect, we
ought to look at the whole universe, not just at one created thing on
its own. (AT 7:55)
Descartes himself holds that when we are inquiring whether the works
of God are perfect, it is suﬃcient that we appreciate that for something to
be good is just for it to be authored by God. The meditator of the Fourth
Meditation is not there yet.69
In the Meditations Descartes is proceeding as a teacher. As he puts it,
the method of the Meditations is a “method of instruction.”70 He is aware
that his student is not yet a Cartesian, and he is aware that the first-person
reasoning of his student would reflect this.71 So will Descartes’ attempts to
instruct him:
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The philosopher knows that it is often useful to assume falsehoods
instead of truths in this way in order to shed light on the truth,
e.g. when astronomers imagine the equator, the zodiac, or other
circles in the sky, or when geometers add new lines to given figures.
Philosophers frequently do the same. If someone calls this ‘having
recourse to artifice, sleight of hand and circumlocution’ and says it
is unworthy of ‘philosophical honesty and the love of truth’ then he
certainly shows that he himself, so far from being philosophically
honest or being prepared to employ any argument at all, simply
wants to indulge in rhetorical display.72
Descartes thinks that in some cases what it means to be philosophically
honest is to employ whatever pedagogical devices are necessary to help a
student arrive at philosophical truth. Otherwise he would not arrive at it:
A philosopher would be no more surprised at such suppositions of
falsity than he would be if, in order to straighten out a curved stick,
we bent it round in the opposite direction.73
In Fourth Replies, Descartes notes that in demonstrating the properties
of a sphere Archimedes would attribute to spheres properties that they
cannot possibly have. Rather than criticize that method, Descartes says
that it was the
comparison between a sphere (or other curvilinear figure) and a
rectilinear figure that enabled Archimedes to demonstrate various
properties of the sphere which could scarcely be understood otherwise. (AT 7:241)
Descartes reports that in the Third Meditation he is doing the same thing
when he explains God’s self-creation in terms of eﬃcient causation even
though talk of God as the eﬃcient cause of Himself “involves an evident
contradiction” (AT 7:242). He admits that such talk is confused, but
[n]onetheless, all the above ways of talking, which are derived by
analogy with the notion of eﬃcient causation, are very necessary for
guiding the natural light in such a way as to enable us to have a clear
awareness of these matters. (AT 7:241)
In the Third Meditation again, he illustrates the way in which our sensory
ideas might represent non-things as things in terms of an idea of cold that
represents cold as existing mind-independently, when perhaps it is only
the absence of mind-independent heat (AT 7:43–44). Many of Descartes’
readers would allow that heat exists mind-independently, but Descartes
himself thinks that like all such qualities it exists only as a sensation.74 And
in the First Meditation, he allows that it is possible that God is a deceiver,
and from the first-person point-of-view concludes that the prospect of hyperbolic doubt is based on “powerful and well thought-out reasons” (AT
7:21–22). Of course, it is totally incoherent:
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take the case of someone who imagines a deceiving god—even the
true God, but not yet clearly enough known to himself or to the
others for whom he frames his hypothesis. Let us suppose that he
does not misuse this fiction for the evil purpose of persuading others to believe something false of the Godhead, but uses it only to
enlighten the intellect, and bring greater knowledge of God’s nature
to himself and to others. Such a person is in no way sinning in order
that good may come. There is no malice at all in his action; he does
something which is good in itself, and no one can rebuke him for it
except slanderously.75
Descartes considers his students to be very confused, and in his attempts
to help them to overcome their confusion he will sometimes make use of
it so long as it is there. One of his aims in the Meditations is to guide us to
the clear and distinct perceptions of metaphysics. His views on what our
minds are like before we do philosophy entail that if he simply presents us
with these perceptions we will bat them away.
We are left with an interpretive decision when it comes to making sense
of the claims of the Fourth Meditation. One option would be to say that
Descartes is simply contradicting himself in putting them forward. This
is certainly a possibility. However, Descartes is inviting us, indeed he is
practically begging us, to proceed diﬀerently. Outside of the Meditations
he reflects the view that finite wills are often subordinated to bodily processes. Inside the Meditations he is representing the thinking of a meditator
who is gradually advancing from a position of confusion, and he is explicit that in assisting the meditator he sometimes resorts to pedagogical devices that are otherwise problematic. One interpretive option is to say that
in making the Fourth Meditation claims about the absolute independence
of finite will Descartes is contradicting himself. Another is to say that the
claims are accepted by the meditator because he is not yet a Cartesian, and
that they have a pedagogical function: getting the meditator to appreciate
the extent of the gap between what we will and what we understand, for
example, and getting him to appreciate that we are not helpless to close it.
Descartes certainly holds that we all have an experience of freedom,76 and
he highlights this experience in the Fourth Meditation, but that does not
mean that he holds that finite will is not restricted in any way.77 The ability
of the will is to aﬃrm or deny ideas, but it cannot do so unless the intellect
considers these ideas: “we cannot will anything without understanding
what we will.”78 A finite will is restricted in many ways, and a disembodied will may well be radically free, but neither of these facts is the focus of
the Fourth Meditation.
IV
Descartes has often been criticized for regarding the human being as essentially a thinking thing—as a detached ego, alienated from the material
world that is so beneath it.79 There are indeed passages in which he focuses on our nature as thinking things, but in very special circumstances,
in which “once in the course of . . . life” (AT 7:17) we attempt to distance
our minds from our bodies and arrive at fundamental truths about God
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and His creation. Elsewhere Descartes emphasizes that we are embodied
human beings, and that our minds and bodies form such a unity that they
comprise a substance in their own right.80 He does some philosophy, but
his conclusions entail that philosophy is not an activity in which an embodied mind should regularly engage.81
Descartes is part of a distinguished tradition of philosophers who are
at the same time anti-philosophical. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
defends the view that things as they are in-themselves are neither spatial
nor temporal. Part of the reason that he does this is to help us to mitigate our desire to pursue questions that torment us but that admit of no
settled answer:
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very
nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.82
If things-in-themselves are neither spatial nor temporal, and if the only
kinds of objects that we can know are spatial or temporal, we can conclude in advance that we cannot know things-in-themselves and so cannot answer questions about ultimate reality. A similar anti-philosophical
tendency appears in the work of Wittgenstein. He argues that what it is
to do philosophy is to use everyday language to pose questions that that
language is ill-equipped to ask. These questions seem to be meaningful,
but until we notice that they are not we will continue to ask them, and
to no avail.83 Kant and Wittgenstein of course disagree with Descartes
about whether or not we can know anything about ultimate reality. Descartes thinks that we can know that God exists, for example, and that
there are extended objects that exist independently of our perception of
them. However, all of three of these figures conclude in their capacity as
philosophers that our urge to engage in philosophical reflection is in need
of moderation.
Descartes is certainly right to hold that anyone who takes seriously the
stoic aim of mental tranquility should temper their urge to do philosophy.
He of course allows, and in fact insists, that an important part of what it is to
be a human being is to be rational. Surprisingly enough, however, he sides
with Hume in arguing that our rational side has been over-emphasized and
that a plan of life that is suitable for a purely rational being is not a plan of
action that is suitable for us.84 The latter writes,
nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to [the]
human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these
biases [that is, our reasonable side, our sociable side, and our active
side] to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she,
but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches
I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which
they introduce. . . . Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy,
be still a man.85
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Descartes agrees. He makes a compelling case for the view that in this life
we should concentrate on the “relaxation of the senses and the repose of
the mind.”86
The University of Iowa
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